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Articles & Other Documents:

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ArmyTimes.com
August 31, 2004

Citing Threats, Guard Boosts Homeland Defense Training

By Jane McHugh, Times staff writer

The National Guard has stepped up its homeland defense training and exercises because of an ongoing pre-election spike in terrorist threats on U.S. soil, its chief said.

The enhanced security drills, called Vigilant Guard, began Aug. 1 and likely will last through the inauguration; they will be conducted in every state and U.S. territory, Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau, said today at a meeting with Army Times reporters and editors.

Blum mentioned "radiological contamination" from transnational terrorists as a possible threat but noted that the National Guard has 22 Civil Support Teams, mobile units equipped to detect and analyze chemical, biological, nuclear and explosive materials, to bolster similar civilian teams.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, the role of the National Guard, comprised of 450,000 reserve soldiers and airmen, has been dramatically transformed from an organization on call for aid in natural disasters and some deployments to a major

fighting force in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as prime homeland security defender. The Guard will be the nation's chief military defender in case of an attack by enemy forces from within or without. "We are in the best position to defeat, deter, deter and delay an attack on the United States of America," Blum said.
"We're seeing a lot of threat stream reporting … not dissimilar" to threats that were heard before 9/11, he said.
He cited the suspected terrorist attacks that recently may have brought down two Russian passenger planes as reason for extra vigilance. The Bush administration has issued warnings that al-Qaida has threatened to strike the continental U.S. to disrupt the presidential election.
http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-330761.php

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Washington Post
September 1, 2004
Pg. 11

Evidence On Iran Called Unclear

IAEA Report on Nuclear Program Is Not Conclusive, Officials Say

By Dafna Linzer, Washington Post Staff Writer

U.N. inspectors have not uncovered definitive evidence that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons program, but they have been unable to clear up a series of suspicions and unanswered questions surrounding Tehran's activities, according to U.S. and Western diplomats who have been briefed on an upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency report.

The United States, which believes Iran could be three to five years away from completing a bomb in secret, shared intelligence tips with the IAEA in June, according to the diplomats, who agreed to discuss the classified information on the condition of anonymity.

Some of that information, including communications intercepts and satellite imagery, was followed up on by IAEA inspectors but did not lead to any discoveries. Several tips have yet to be fully explored and others were considered too vague, the diplomats said.

The IAEA's mixed report, which officials said will note improved cooperation from the Iranians in recent months, comes as the Bush administration is trying to make a case for stepping up pressure on the Islamic republic. Experts said the report's findings -- which could be made public as early as today -- will be a critical factor in that effort.

The United States lacks enough support from the IAEA's other 34 members to send the issue to the U.N. Security Council, which can assess international sanctions against Iran. But U.S. officials said they would continue to push for such an outcome.

Iran insists its program is peaceful and aimed at producing a stable energy source and has said it wants to avoid a showdown at the United Nations. Both sides are hoping the report will help sway board opinions.

"The report doesn't exonerate Iran, but it's not going to help get Iran to the Security Council, either," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, which recently revealed satellite photos of suspect sites that Iran leveled this year.

The IAEA is investigating those sites and other lines of inquiry, including Iran's relationship to a Pakistani scientist who ran a nuclear black market that was exposed last year.

Information regarding Abdul Qadeer Khan's shadowy network is expected to feature prominently in the IAEA's report. Inspectors recently determined that some samples of uranium found in Iran were brought in on contaminated equipment Tehran bought from the network. That finding help support Iran's earlier contention that the presence of uranium was caused by the tainted equipment, not by a secret program to enrich uranium for a bomb.

Among the areas still being pursued are questions related to Iran's potential nuclear weaponization activities, an inventory of equipment and materials purchases Iran made on the black market and the possibility that it could have obtained weapons designs similar to the ones Libya bought from the same network.

U.S. officials said they will emphasize those issues when it presses the IAEA board at a Sept. 13 meeting in Vienna to increase pressure on Tehran by referring the matter to the Security Council.

But they said much will depend on the position taken by Europe's three main powers -- France, Britain and Germany. Officials there have become deeply frustrated with Iran but are reluctant to take the matter to the council, a move Iran would perceive as a threat.

The three countries offered Iran incentives to give up suspicious aspects of its nuclear program. A deal was reached but fell apart in June after the IAEA reported that Iran wasn't fully cooperating with its inspectors.

Iran responded to the report and an angry rebuke by the IAEA's board by restarting the work it had suspended, including the construction of centrifuge equipment that could be used to enrich uranium.

The reaction was unexpected and hurt relations between Europe and Iran. Analysts said the tone of the next report will affect the possibility of talks between the two sides.
"If the IAEA says Iran is cooperating, then there is still an opening for the Europeans and others to work with them," said Shireen T. Hunter, an Iran specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "But if the report is critical and comes up with examples of poor cooperation or secret work, then obviously pressure will mount to send this to the United Nations."
Flynt Leverett, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center and a former staff member of the National Security Council in the Bush administration, said he doubts that Iran will be referred to the United Nations at this point.
"The administration's Iran policy right now on the nuclear issue is to get the Europeans fired up enough to go the council," Leverett said. "But short of a sighting of a mushroom cloud, I don't think there is anything in this report that can get the board to vote for a Security Council referral. I just don't think that's where the Europeans or the other people on the board are right now."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50493-2004Aug31.html

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Japan Times
September 1, 2004

U.S. Looks To Counter North Korean Missiles

WASHINGTON (Kyodo) -- The U.S. Defense Department plans to deploy 15 Aegis destroyers to Japan's vicinity in the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean by 2006 as part of defense activities aimed at countering North Korean missiles, according to department sources.
The Aegis vessels will be equipped with advanced systems capable of intercepting and tracking ballistic missiles, such as North Korea's Nodong and Taepodong missiles, the sources said.
In the first stage of deployment, two Aegis destroyers will be permanently stationed in the Sea of Japan and three others in Hawaii later this year.
All five will belong to the 7th Fleet, based at the U.S. Navy's Yokosuka base in Kanagawa Prefecture, the sources said.
The Defense Department also plans to deploy three missile cruisers to the area equipped with sea-based Standard Missile 3 interceptors, according to the sources.
With the Aegis system providing advanced aerial defense and the capability to intercept enemy missiles over a long distance and extensive period of time, the destroyers are also expected to contribute by providing data to the U.S. forces' ground-based missile defense systems.
U.S. Navy Secretary Gordon England said in March that the department plans to deploy 11 Aegis destroyers and cruisers, though he did not reveal the dispatch locations.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040901a4.htm

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New York Times
September 1, 2004

As Anxiety Grows, So Does Field Of Terror Study

By Claire Hoffman
On a summer evening in a TriBeCa classroom at Metropolitan College of New York, graduate students pored over spreadsheets, calculating how prepared the elderly residents of Harlem would be for a dirty-bomb attack. In a course titled "The Impact of Disaster on Communities," the students analyzed the catastrophic possibilities for New York City and its residents.
Motivated by the terror attacks of 9/11, colleges have rushed to create counterterrorism and homeland security courses, and thousands of students in New York and elsewhere are pursuing degrees in that area, making disaster one of the fastest-growing fields in academia.
Drawn together under the unofficial banner of homeland security studies, these programs, which include undergraduate degrees as well as master's and doctoral programs, use an interdisciplinary approach, teaching students how to psychoanalyze terrorists, conduct crowd control and remain calm in front of reporters.

"You are dealing with the dark side of humanity," said Olymar Alsina, 27, who will graduate next spring from Metropolitan College with a master's degree in emergency and disaster management. "But the fact that you are addressing it or minimizing the damage reflects some sort of hope that what you do will have an outcome."

Over the last three years, nearly 100 private and state colleges have introduced programs in terrorism and emergency management. In New York City, both Metropolitan College, which changed its name from Audrey Cohen College in 2002, and John Jay College of Criminal Justice have introduced master's programs that specialize in terrorism and disaster management. New York University is putting together a certificate program focusing on homeland security. Other private and state colleges, from North Dakota State University in Fargo to George Washington University in Washington, have introduced doctorate programs in terrorism and emergency management.

B. Wayne Blanchard, who heads the Federal Emergency Management Agency's higher education project, said that when he began his job almost a decade ago, four programs in the country focused on disaster management. Today, there are 115 degree programs, with 100 more colleges considering adding them.

The study of terrorism and emergency management has grown out of traditional disaster studies, which were once the domain of community colleges and focused on managing "first responders" - the police, fire and paramedic forces that responded to hurricanes and riots. But in recent years, major state and private universities have joined in, offering courses like "Public Health and Disasters" and "Terrorism and Apocalyptic Violence."

With its focus on worst-case planning, the field often attracts the highly pragmatic.

"I am somewhat of a perfectionist," said Kristy Ashberry, 25, who graduated from the University of North Texas with a bachelor's degree and then a master's in emergency preparedness. Today she is an emergency management coordinator for the city of Rockwell, just outside Dallas. "Some people's brains aren't wired to deal with all the details, but I am," she said.

Ms. Alsina, the New York student, combines her studies at Metropolitan College with a full-time job teaching at Edward A. Reynolds West Side High School in Manhattan. For her master's project, Ms. Alsina, who once worked at the World Trade Center, is writing a manual for her high school on responding to an attack, be it from a terrorist or a student.

The aim of most of these programs is not to train the next generation of C.I.A. terrorism analysts, but to educate local officials and corporate managers who have largely been given the task of mitigating disasters.

This year, the Department of Homeland Security has doled out about $70 million in grant money to colleges and universities. With the agency's annual budget of $32 billion, there is the powerful lure of new jobs at state and local agencies, as well as corporations that benefit from its grants.

"The federal government is pumping billions into the Department of Homeland Security, and the students are seeing that and saying, 'Hey, there are jobs here,' " said David A. McEntire, who heads the nation's oldest terrorism and emergency management program, at the University of North Texas, in Denton, 35 miles northwest of Dallas.

Mr. McEntire said that while the Texas program began in 1984, it was only after 9/11 and the creation of the Homeland Security Department that demand for the bachelor's and master's degree programs increased sharply.

And while the question of the nation's preparedness for disaster has become increasingly charged with the debate over the 9/11 Commission report, the focus of most students remains much more basic.

"All the students we have been involved with haven't seen this as a political issue, but as a way to come together for their country," said Melvin Bernstein, the director of university programs at the Department of Homeland Security.

Kent Theurer, 22, a student at North Dakota State University's emergency management program, said his parents were concerned about his long-term prospects if fears of terrorism should begin to ebb.

"One of the unfortunate things about emergency management is there doesn't seem to be a solid stream of funding," Mr. Theurer said, noting how security budgets can rise and fall with the threat levels.

Indeed, terrorism is now regarded as the flashy side of disaster studies. But at Metropolitan College, the students will not get to terrorism studies until the third and final semester of their program - and only after they have done the hard work of understanding more traditional subjects like flood planning and blackout strategies.

With their constant meditation on disaster, many students said it was important for them to maintain an active social life and to remain positive about the future.

"That we have some control over how extensive harm can be, I think that is the optimistic side of me that kind of emerged out of all this craziness," Ms. Alsina said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/01/nyregion/01disaster.html

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Los Angeles Times

Iran to Resume Uranium Enrichment

12:11 PM PDT, September 1, 2004

From Reuters
VIENNA, Austria — The United States accused Iran today of threatening global peace with its plans to process 37 tons of raw "yellowcake" uranium, which one Western nuclear expert said would be enough to build five atomic bombs.
The comments from a U.S. official was a response to a report by U.N. inspectors on Tehran's nuclear activities that listed unresolved issues, but contained nothing to confirm U.S. allegations that Tehran is building a bomb.
In the confidential report, obtained in full by Reuters, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said Iran planned a large-scale test of a uranium conversion facility this month.
"Iran's announcements are further strong evidence of the compelling need to take Iran's nuclear program to the Security Council," U.S. Under Secretary of State John Bolton said in a statement to Reuters. The U.N. Security Council can impose economic sanctions.
"The United States will continue to urge other members of the IAEA Board of Governors to join us in this effort, to deal with the Iranian threat to international peace and security."
Tehran insists the only purpose of its nuclear program is the peaceful generation of electricity.
The U.N. agency said it "continues to make steady progress in understanding the (Iranian nuclear) program," though its investigation is not complete.
"It is a work in progress," a senior Western diplomat said of the investigation, adding that the IAEA's sixth such report on Iran was "a mixed bag."
The unresolved issues include enriched-uranium particles found in Iran, work on advanced P-2 centrifuges that can make bomb-grade uranium, and suspected Iranian attempts to buy equipment with both military and civilian nuclear applications.
The report will be discussed at a meeting of IAEA Board of Governors in September. While Washington would like the board to report Iran to the Security Council for violating its non-proliferation obligations, diplomats at the U.N. say Washington has few supporters for such a step now.
ENOUGH FOR FIVE CRUDE BOMBS
The IAEA said Iranian technicians had told its inspectors they planned to convert 37 tons of "yellowcake" uranium into uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feed material for centrifuges.
David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and currently president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), said the conversion could give Iran the raw material to produce some 100 kg (220 lb) of bomb-grade highly-enriched uranium.
Albright said if the UF6 was later enriched sufficiently, "it's roughly enough for about five crude nuclear weapons of the type Iran could conceivably build."
He said he was surprised at the many unresolved issues in Iran, adding that it was "difficult to keep track of them all."
But he said Washington could not point to the report as proof of an Iranian weapons program. "There's nothing in this report that says 'Gotcha Iran!', no smoking gun," he said.
Iran's foreign ministry acknowledged the report left questions unanswered but dismissed them as insignificant.
"There are some minor issues remaining which we hope will be solved in the future although some are trying to make a fuss and create a negative atmosphere about Iran," ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said in a statement.
The IAEA said it had received enough information about Iran's laser uranium enrichment program and uranium conversion experiments to end its special probes of those issues.
The agency also said Iran's explanation for the discovery of traces of highly-enriched uranium at the Natanz enrichment plant and Kalaye Electric Company was "plausible."
Iran said the particles came from contaminated machinery purchased abroad and were not enriched at Natanz or Kalaye.
However, the IAEA said it was still investigating other possible explanations for the traces, which several diplomats said included the possibility that Iran had enriched the uranium itself at a secret location inside the country.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-090104irannuke_wr,1,406177.story?coll=la-home-headlines

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New York Times
Iran Said to Be Nearing Enrichment of Uranium
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: September 1, 2004
Filed at 3:01 p.m. ET

VIENNA, Austria (AP) -- Iran plans to process tons of raw uranium and restart its centrifuges -- two activities that can be used to make nuclear warheads, the U.N. atomic watchdog agency and diplomats said Wednesday.
The United States -- which accuses Tehran of running a weapons program -- said the revelations provided further evidence Iran's nuclear activities pose ``a threat to international peace and security."
A confidential report by the International Atomic Energy Agency said it had been informed that Iran planned to process more than 40 tons of uranium into uranium hexafluoride.
Uranium hexafluoride is spun in centrifuges to produce enriched uranium, which in turn can be used to generate power or make nuclear warheads, depending on the degree of enrichment.
A senior diplomat familiar with the agency declined to say how much hexafluoride could be obtained from 40 tons of raw uranium, also known as yellowcake, beyond saying it was a ``substantial amount."
But former nuclear weapons inspector David Albright, who now heads the Institute for Science and International Security, said it could theoretically yield more than 200 pounds of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium.
``Hypothetically, that's enough to make five crude nuclear weapons," he said.
The report, obtained by The Associated Press, was circulated to diplomats ahead of the agency's board meeting, which starts Sept. 13. It did not specify what plans Iran had for the uranium hexafluoride.
But two other diplomats, speaking separately, told AP that Iran had also informed the agency that it planned to introduce a ``substance" into its 64-cascade centrifuge facility at Natanz as early as next month. Iran appeared to be alluding to uranium hexafluoride, they said.
Uranium hexafluoride is normally put in such centrifuges and spun repeatedly and at varying lengths of time depending on the degree of enrichment sought. Uranium enriched above 90 percent is considered weapons grade.
The senior diplomat said any uranium hexafluoride Iran produces ``could be the feed stock for Natanz."
The issue of enrichment is extremely sensitive as the international community tries to determine if Iran is using its nuclear program for peaceful purposes only, as Tehran insists, or trying to make weapons.
The United States says Iran is working to produce nuclear weapons, and U.S. officials are spearheading an effort at the Sept. 13 IAEA board of governors meeting to have Tehran declared in violation of its nonproliferation commitments -- a move that could force the U.N. Security Council to take action against Iran.
U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said the U.N. report bolstered Washington's case and was ``further strong evidence of the compelling need to take Iran's nuclear program to the Security Council.
``The United States will continue to urge other members of the IAEA board of governors to join us in this effort, to deal with the Iranian threat to international peace and security," he said in an e-mail to the AP.
Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment program last year in an effort to build international trust. But that commitment eroded over the subsequent months, and in July, Iran confirmed reports that it had resumed building nuclear centrifuges.
That led to increased accusations from the United States and European nations that Iran had reneged on its pledge, something Tehran denied, arguing it was not actually producing enriched uranium, while reserving the right to do so.
With revelations Wednesday of its plans to produce uranium hexafluoride, and the reports by diplomats that it would start up some centrifuges at Natanz, Iran appeared to be moving toward breaching that final threshold as well.
On other issues of concern, the report suggested it was possible that some traces of enriched uranium found inside the country were not domestically manufactured but came in on equipment it bought on the nuclear black market. Iran says that was the case for most of the traces. But the report stopped short of absolving Tehran on the issue, saying it and related concerns ``continue to be investigated." And the senior diplomat said the origins of other traces still need to be established.
The report also said more investigation was needed into Iranian claims that Tehran had not conducted enrichment experiments with its advanced P-2 centrifuge between 1995, when it illicitly bought them, and 2002, when its clandestine activities came to light.
While listing a series of other concerns, the 11-page report credited Iran with providing information and access that allowed IAEA investigators to clarify some issues and make progress on others. But it urged faster and better cooperation.
``In some cases ... the provision of new information has been prompt," said the report, written by IAEA Director General Mohamed Elbaradei. ``In other cases, sufficiently detailed information has, despite repeated requests, been provided so late that it has not been possible to include an assessment of its .... correctness."
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-UN-Nuclear-Agency-Iran.html?pagewanted=all

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Washington Post
September 2, 2004
Pg. 13

Rejecting International Pressure, Iran To Process Uranium

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

Iran, in a fresh rebuff of demands that it abandon its nuclear ambitions, has decided to process a large quantity of uranium into a precursor ingredient used in making both commercial nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons, the U.N. atomic watchdog agency said yesterday.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, in a confidential report, said Iran intends to convert more than 40 tons of uranium into uranium hexafluoride (UF 6) gas, an intermediate step in the complex process of making enriched uranium. The plan, if carried out, would represent a significant step forward for Iran's nuclear program and -- in the view of Bush administration officials -- a growing threat. In theory, that much uranium could yield as many as five crude nuclear bombs.

Administration officials reacted strongly to the revelation, vowing to launch a new effort this month to bring Iran before the U.N. Security Council for international censure. "The United States will continue to urge others . . . to join us in the effort to deal with the Iranian threat to international peace and security," said John R. Bolton, the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.

Iran emphatically denies seeking nuclear weapons, but it insists it will assert its legal right to develop a commercial nuclear power industry. Although international inspectors have found no hard evidence linking the Islamic state to a nuclear weapons program, Iran's credibility has been battered by numerous disclosures of past Iranian attempts to conceal sensitive nuclear research.

Iran has also angered key U.S. allies in Europe by backing away from commitments to freeze components of its nuclear program, including the production of centrifuge machines used in enriching uranium. In an agreement reached last fall with Britain, France and Germany, Iran promised to suspend the production of enriched uranium in return for trade and technical assistance.

Iran's decision to begin the conversion of 37 tonnes (40.7 tons) of raw yellowcake uranium into UF 6 is seen by U.S. officials and many weapons experts as a further flouting of Iran's commitments. Several experts described the quantity as surprising and disturbing.

The revelation was contained in an IAEA report that otherwise contained much favorable news for the Islamic republic. The document -- one in a series of periodic updates on the findings of a U.N. investigation of Iran's nuclear program -- gave the Iranians high marks for cooperating with international inspectors. Unlike past reports, it featured no bombshells about past Iranian nuclear activity. It concluded that Iran had "plausibly" explained the existence of some particles of enriched uranium found in several of Iran's nuclear facilities -- particles that now appear to have entered the country on contaminated equipment purchased on the black market.

With the new report, the Bush administration faces diminishing prospects for finding "smoking gun" evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program -- and also, perhaps, for rounding up international support for tough action against Iran, said Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director for nonproliferation studies at the Carnegie Institute for International Peace. "Iran has answered the questions about its past while moving ahead with its enrichment program -- and we don't have a process in place to convince them to give it up," Wolfsthal said. "There's an open stretch of highway leading up to nuclear capability for Iran, and not a roadblock in sight."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52456-2004Sep1.html

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New York Times
September 2, 2004

Pakistan Found To Aid Iran Nuclear Efforts

By David E. Sanger

A new assessment of Iran's nuclear program by the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency says that, as early as 1995, Pakistan was providing Tehran with the designs for sophisticated centrifuges capable of making bomb-grade nuclear fuel. It also finds evidence that, as of the mid-August, Iran had assembled and tested the major components for 70 of the machines, which it showed to inspectors from the agency.

But the report, issued to members of the agency yesterday as a confidential document, provided no new evidence of the kind of covert programs that the agency has discovered in the last year, and suggested that the Iranian government was slowly becoming more helpful to inspectors. That assessment, American officials said, is likely to discourage moves by the Bush administration to take Iran to the United Nations Security Council for penalties

unless it dismantles its program, which the Iranians say is entirely peaceful and which the United States says is designed to produce nuclear weapons.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, returning from a brief visit to Panama, told reporters yesterday that the Bush administration was still studying the report but that the United States would definitely push the agency's board of governors in September to refer Iran's lack of cooperation to the United Nations Security Council, where further steps would be considered.
The administration has tried such a step in the past but failed to get enough votes on the board, and Mr. Powell said yesterday that it remained to be seen "whether there is a consensus" on the board now.
In an interview last week with The New York Times, President Bush suggested that he would be patient, and would pursue diplomatic means to halt any Iranian weapons program. "We'll continue pressing diplomatically," Mr. Bush said.
He said the cases of Iran and North Korea were different from that of Iraq. "Diplomacy failed for 11 years in Iraq," he said. "And this new diplomatic effort is barely a year ago."
Senator John Kerry has argued that Mr. Bush has allowed the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea to speed forward while the United States is engaged in Iraq.
The report will help Europe and Russia - two of Iran's largest trading partners, with much to lose if penalties are enacted - which are seeking to defuse any confrontation. In the absence of what one senior European official called "a smoking nuke," the report issued yesterday seems likely to delay any major decisions on how to deal with Iran until after the American presidential election. But the report also suggested that the Iranians fully intended to move forward with the production of uranium, on a much larger scale than in the past.
The report, issued under the name of the agency's director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, notes Iranian plans to conduct an industrial-scale test of a plant that converts raw uranium into nuclear fuel. Iranian officials, the agency reported, plan to turn 37 tons of nearly raw uranium, called yellowcake, into uranium hexafluoride. That, in turn, is poured into the centrifuges for enrichment.
Several specialists in the United States government and outside said that amount of uranium could be enough to produce fuel for five or six atomic weapons. But Iran insists that it only intends to use enriched uranium for electric production, a contention American officials dismiss. A country with huge oil reserves, they say, has no need for nuclear power.
The report states that Iran received the design for an advanced centrifuge, called a P-2 because it was a second-generation machine designed in Pakistan, as early as 1995. American intelligence officials have said they had no evidence, throughout the 1990's, that Iran was receiving aid from Pakistan, so the atomic energy agency's findings suggest what one senior intelligence official called "a fairly major failure, despite the fact that we were watching Iran and Pakistan quite closely." Three years later, Pakistan conducted its first nuclear tests.
But Iran, which had invested in an earlier model of the centrifuges, has insisted to inspectors that it did not begin producing the newer, far more sophisticated machinery until two years ago. The agency said it was still investigating that.
Though the report does not cite the source of the purchase, it is now known to have come from the laboratories of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the Pakistani bomb. Pakistan's government has argued that it had no knowledge of Dr. Khan's clandestine activities, which included sales to Libya and North Korea starting about the same time.
"What Iran got came almost entirely from one country," said a senior international diplomat who had been briefed on the findings. "And it seems to point directly back to Pakistan's own laboratories."
The origin of the equipment is especially important because Iran is trying to explain why some samples of uranium taken by the agency show that it has been enriched far beyond the levels needed to produce nuclear power, though a little short of the usual purity for bomb fuel. In the report, the agency says that its studies indicate that it is "plausible" that some of the samples it took in Iran had been contaminated by equipment that was previously used elsewhere, presumably in Pakistan.
If it is true, it would help lift suspicion that Iran was already producing uranium suitable for arms. But agency officials are still suspicious that some of the uranium could have been produced elsewhere in Iran, at plants they have yet to discover.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/02/international/middleeast/02iran.html

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
September/October 2004
Pg. 48

Missile Defense: Winning Minds, Not Hearts

The U.S. plan to build a global missile defense has been gaining international support, but not because other governments believe it will make their countries safer.

By Nicole C. Evans

Missile defense is a complex and often misunderstood subject that tends to evoke strong emotional responses, and many continue to feel that missile defense poses a serious risk to international security. Nevertheless, there has been a surprising international movement toward supporting and cooperating with the Bush administration's global missile defense (GMD) project.

Earlier versions of missile defense maintained the distinction between national missile defense (NMD) and theater defenses. NMD is an antiballistic missile defense system that provides protection for a country as a whole against ballistic missile attack. Theater defenses provide protection in a theater of operation, countering missiles with a range of less than 3,500 kilometers. The distinction is important because national defenses may undermine strategic stability by threatening the ability of other countries to retaliate, which is the core of their deterrence. Theater defenses do not pose this danger.

George W. Bush's administration has changed all this, though, severely complicating an already intricate situation. Since 2002, Bush's version of global missile defense has effectively collapsed national and theater defenses together by envisaging the protection of the American "homeland" with NMD and the protection of American troops, bases, and allies abroad with theater missile defenses (TMD). Long-term American missile defense plans envision a layered system using land, sea, and air platforms to neutralize incoming missiles. The result has been to create a definitional and policy haze.

Countries that once supported only theater defenses now find themselves tacitly supporting global defense by association, while claiming that they are only participating in non-destabilizing forms of missile defense. Russia's previous policy of supporting TMD but vigorously opposing NMD has been compromised.

Overall, this strategy has paid off for the Bush administration, as more and more countries hop aboard the GMD train. The first rudimentary parts of the American missile defense system will be deployed this fall with the basing of interceptor missiles in Alaska and California.

Why some support missile defense

The turning point for those countries wavering in their support of missile defense came in December 2001, when Russia seemingly acquiesced in the American abandonment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, thus removing other nations' earlier fears that cooperating with U.S. missile defense plans would jeopardize relations with Russia and undermine arms control regimes. Four key factors led to the apparently increasing support for American plans.

First, most states recognized that the Bush administration was resolutely determined to proceed with its missile defense project regardless of whether it had international support. It was not surprising that countries began deciding they would prefer to be inside the tent, where they could have some policy input, rather than outside the tent and out in the cold.

Second, cooperation with the United States was seen to offer political gains. President Vladimir Putin probably calculated that Russia was more likely to curb its biggest concern--unbridled American unilateralism--through limited cooperation rather than condemnation of missile defense. For other states, a good relationship with the United States is of paramount concern.

Third, there is a strong belief that significant financial, technical, and industrial gains will emerge. The United States suggested that Russian firms would be able to bid for lucrative missile defense orders, while European and Asian partners have already received profitable contracts.

Finally, there are clear military gains for some states from missile defense cooperation, most notably in troop protection.

The state of play

Cooperation on missile defense by North American and European nations has largely occurred within existing security architectures. In April, Canada agreed to an early warning system for North America to be operated by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Canada had little choice; if NORAD were sidelined, Canada would abdicate its control over continental air defense. This would be a significant loss--through NORAD, Canada has been able to exercise disproportionate influence in relation to its military expenditures and resources.

At the Prague summit in November 2002, NATO member states agreed to initiate a missile defense feasibility study to examine options for a layered TMD. The successful bidders for the study were announced in September 2003, and work is slowly progressing. Several member states are developing their own missile defense capabilities, which may later be integrated with a NATO system. Germany has several American Patriot I TMDs and is developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System in conjunction with the United States and Italy. Britain has finalized an agreement with the United States to upgrade the Fylingdales early-warning radar, and has created the British Missile Defence Centre to interface with its American sister agency. However, Britain continues to insist that missile

defenses need to be balanced with global nuclear deterrence, focusing its efforts on TMD and the protection of troops. The British government is also optimistic about the potential benefits for its defense industry.

In contrast to popular perception, Paris does not fully reject missile defenses. French and Italian firms are jointly developing the Aster TMD system. France's view is similar to that of Russia: TMDs are useful, but NMD is destabilizing. France's main objections to global missile defense are driven by a concern, shared by the British, that it will replace cooperative diplomacy and produce a spiralling arms race in a futile search for invulnerability.

In Asia, cooperation on missile defense is built on long-standing friendships with the United States. Japan has joint TMD programs with the United States, although Japan's Patriot IIs and Aegis destroyers operate independently. Tokyo's interest was catalyzed when North Korea lobbed a Taepodong-1 missile across the Sea of Japan in 1998. Japan also realizes that the United States, its only alliance partner, would regard failure to cooperate on missile defense to be a deal breaker. In December 2003, Japan announced that it would construct a layered missile defense system, using both Aegis destroyers and Patriot III missiles. Japan's gradual move away from its traditional pacifist stance is also seen in its March 2003 launch of two military satellites.

Another piece of the GMD puzzle fell into place in December 2003, when Australia announced its participation. The move was primarily justified in terms of the North Korean threat, and the Australian government insists there will be substantial economic dividends. In response, Indonesia issued a strongly worded warning that Australian-backed GMD could trigger an arms race and undermine regional stability. Indo-American cooperation also threatens the precarious regional balance by menacing both China and Pakistan. The U.S.-India Defense Policy Group meets regularly and in March held a simulated missile defense exercise. In January, the United States announced that it would give India access to sensitive space, nuclear, and missile defense technology. But this cooperation may now be downgraded, as the newly elected Congress Party and its leftist allies have been critical of India's unambiguous support for GMD.

Finally, Israel is the only Middle Eastern country cooperating on missile defense. American Patriot missiles were deployed in Israel during the first Gulf War and Israel subsequently developed its indigenous Arrow system with the United States. The Arrow was first deployed in 2002 and operates alongside Patriot III installations, but it has not been tested in combat.

Russia's conditions for cooperation

In both Europe and Asia, Russian theater defense policy is driven by three aims: to be a key player in the development of regional security structures; to ensure that regional structures are not directed against Russia; and to foster a multipolar international system, curbing perceived American unilateralism. Russia sees theater-defense cooperation as part of the global war on terror and as potentially yielding dividends for its defense industry.

The idea of a limited European TMD was first mooted in 1994, but a framework for cooperation was not developed until the NATO-Russia Council was established in May 2002. Under its auspices, NATO and Russia conducted groundbreaking exercises in Colorado from March 8 to March 12 to ensure that they can quickly and effectively work together to counter a missile threat against troops deployed on a joint mission.

Russian TMD efforts in Asia have been more restrained. In 2002, Russia proposed a regional missile defense system that would encompass Russia, China, the United States, and Japan, as well as bilateral cooperation with Japan and Pakistan. But attempts to propose an alternative to U.S. global missile defense have not been successful due to long-standing American missile defense interests in the region. The only concrete outcome is that in June Russia finalized the sale of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to China.

Beginning in September 2002, statements by Russian deputy foreign and defense ministers revealed a willingness to cooperate with Washington on missile defense. President Vladimir Putin explicitly backed this approach in late January 2003. The development was foreshadowed in May 2002, when the United States agreed to assist Russia in improving its early warning system through the establishment of a joint ballistic missile launch information-sharing center. But pledges to continue developing the Russian-American Observa-tion Satellite warning system ended in February, when the system was dropped from the U.S. defense budget request for fiscal 2005. In April, a draft agreement called for establishing a missile attack early warning system and other land components of missile defense that do not involve the potential militarization of space. However, this attempt harks back to a failed 1998 Clinton-Yeltsin plan to develop a joint warning system in Moscow, for which there proved to be a significant lack of political will. It is difficult to imagine that meaningful progress will occur when even mundane and noncontroversial plans cannot be brought to fruition.

Russia has attached clear conditions to its cooperation with the United States on missile defense. First, GMD cannot threaten Russian national interests. Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Yury Baluyevsky has repeatedly said that the goal of Russian cooperation is to create systems that can defend against single missile launches by accident, by a rogue state, or by terrorists. Russia does not believe that current missile defenses threaten its nuclear forces, nor that defenses will be able to neutralize its large strategic offensive arsenal for the foreseeable future.

Second, cooperation needs to occur on the basis of equality, which reflects Russia's desire to be perceived and treated as an equal partner.
Third, Russian technologies and intellectual property must be protected from cunning Americans who may steal Russian ideas under cover of cooperation. Russia has operated an area missile defense around Moscow since the late 1960s, and Russians believe that defense has bequeathed them a legacy of potentially valuable experience and technology. The Kremlin is keen to protect and promote this potentially profit-making element of its defense sector.
Fourth, space must be demilitarized and GMD prevented from extending into space.
Finally, cooperation should be built around a legal framework. Russia has said that an agreement on missile defense is a precondition of cooperation. Moscow has persisted in attempting to encourage the United States to agree to a substitute for the now defunct ABM Treaty, but has been repeatedly rebuffed. Russia aims to maintain the link between offensive and defensive weapons with a view to protect strategic stability within a legal framework clearly delineating Russia and the United States as equal strategic partners.

Russian and Chinese concerns

Russia and China share two key concerns about American missile defense plans: that their nuclear deterrent is threatened and that American missile defense plans will destabilize arms control. The threat posed is far more immediate for China, whose nuclear forces are Lilliputian in comparison to American and Russian nuclear arsenals.
Both Russia and China have responded actively to the American abandonment of the ABM Treaty by developing asymmetrical measures to neutralize any potential threat. By withdrawing from START II, Russia was able to continue deploying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Putin announced in October 2003 that Moscow intends to place on combat duty dozens of MIRVed SS-19s, and Russia has also extended the service life of its SS-18 heavy ICBMs. Russia has begun building the fourth-generation Borey class of submarines, is MIRVing its silo-based Topol-M, and is finishing testing the mobile version of the Topol-M. Russia regards its new Topol-M ICBMs, originally designed in the 1980s as a counter to Reagan's Star Wars, as a "silver bullet" against American missile defenses.
During Russia's nuclear military exercises in February, most attention focused on the failure of two submarine missile launches, with little attention paid to the successful testing of a new hypersonic "Crazy Ivan" warhead that follows a nonclassical scenario, changing flight altitude and course repeatedly, making it nearly impossible to track and target. Putin declared Russia able to penetrate any missile defense system with ease. With characteristic *khitryi* (sly) wit, Putin commented that just as the Americans insisted that their decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty was not directed at Russia, Russia's modernization of its nuclear arms and other new weapons developments is not directed at the United States.
Russia has also upgraded the A-135 strategic single-site ABM system covering Moscow, the only such system currently in operation. In 2002, Russia began working in earnest on TMD and is currently developing several advanced missile interceptors, such as the S-500, which would add to its current arsenal of S-300 and advanced S-400 interceptors. Russia has also successfully tested ship-based interceptors.
But the Kremlin has clearly indicated that it has no intention of keeping up with the Joneses on missile defense. Putin had said that while he does not rule out the development of a national missile defense at some point in the future, deployment would depend on how work moves ahead in other countries. Russia also continues to rebuild its ailing early warning system and to bolster its military satellite constellations. Since 2002, Russia has indulged in numerous military exercises, each increasing in size and ambition. The May 2003 exercises even involved hypothetical nuclear strikes on the United States and the neutralization of American satellites to blind Pentagon planners. All these measures have been buttressed by a steady increase in defense spending. Senior Russian figures, including Putin, have increased the frequency and import accorded to their visits to strategic military installations.
Both Russia and China appear unconvinced by American assurances that global missile defense is not directed against them, despite echoing American rhetoric about the need to defend against the terrorist threat. Senior Russian military and foreign affairs officials have argued that while the United States proclaims its partnership with Russia, its actions show anything but that. In January 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov expressed particular concern about U.S. plans to enhance radar stations in Britain and Greenland, as the likely routes of missile launches from rogue states do not cross those areas. Washington's plans to develop "bunker buster" nuclear weapons only add to Moscow's and Beijing's unease. They are seen as having the potential to disrupt the existing parity of nuclear deterrence and drastically alter the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.
General Baluyevsky, commenting on such developments, said: "It's very scary, extremely scary."1 Russian concerns are further aggravated by America's stated intention not to cut its nuclear arsenal to levels designated by the Moscow Treaty of May 2002--instead moving the missiles as well as the warheads into storage as a hedge against an uncertain future.
Beijing's distrust of American intentions is fueled by its belief that global missile defense is yet another manifestation of American unilateralism and a key component of an American attempt at worldwide domination.

U.S. efforts to sharpen its swords and expand its shields are seen as posing a significant threat to China's nuclear deterrent. China's nuclear strategy is one of minimum deterrence--that potential enemies will be deterred as long as uncertainty remains about China's ability to launch retaliatory action.

China remains one of the few countries adamantly opposed to TMD. The U.S. decision to sell Patriot III missiles to Taiwan further destabilized the region. China remains fearful of nuclear blackmail on the Taiwan issue, and the deployment of TMD could encourage China to adopt a preemptive escalatory posture. China is also concerned that an American-Taiwanese missile defense would subsume Taiwanese military forces under American command. Japan and the United States already have a military alliance, and command integration for Taiwan could mark the beginning of an explicit U.S.-Taiwanese alliance against the mainland. Taiwan, which appears sensitive to the implications of such a move, appears to be gently stepping backward on missile defense by canceling maintenance contracts for its Patriot IIIs.

While China has been modernizing its forces since the 1980s, it has also been influenced more recently by projected American missile defense plans. Not surprisingly, Beijing is moving toward a more diversified, invulnerable, and combat-ready operational nuclear triad. China's current strategic deterrent consists of 20 silo-based Dong Feng-5 ICBMs, which are liquid-fueled and thus kept at low readiness with their warheads stored separately. China's newest intermediate-range ballistic missiles are solid-fuel mobile Dong Feng-21As, and China is developing mobile ICBMs as well. If China believes that American global missile defenses are undermining its nuclear deterrent, it could MIRV and attach decoys to its ballistic missiles. In a tense situation, as exists in the Taiwan Strait, missiles on high alert only aggravate the possibility of escalation or accidental or preemptive war.

Having identified America's military Achilles' heel--its increased dependence on vulnerable space-based assets--China has also accelerated its military space program, exploring ways to neutralize American military satellites in the event of conflict.

Second, Russia and China are very concerned that American missile defense plans will destabilize existing arms control regimes and forestall future agreements. Russia has repeatedly argued that GMD diverts resources from the war against terror and runs counter to the Bush-Putin commitment to reducing nuclear arsenals. China has declared that Japan's missile defense plans could undermine the regional balance and trigger a new arms race. It is not clear whether this is a threat or a prediction.

Russia, China, and other states express deep concern about the weaponization of space. In 2003, Russia and China proposed an agreement for the non-weaponization of space, and negotiations continue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Both Moscow and Beijing maintain that nonproliferation measures and policing regimes are a better way of dealing with weapons of mass destruction than attempts to develop missile shields.

The bottom line

The U.S. pursuit of global missile defense has some international support. But that support is not attributable to a shared commitment to America's strategic vision. Rather, it results from pragmatic calculations on how to engage with the world's only remaining superpower. In some ways, it is almost as if countries are simply waiting for the GMD storm to pass.

The real danger lies in the potential of GMD to disrupt delicate regional balances and to encourage the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons. The United States, China, and Russia have all stepped up their offensive weapons programs since the dissolution of the ABM Treaty.

The danger has been succinctly summarized by Mohamed El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency: "If we don't stop using double standards, we shall be piled high with an even greater number of nuclear weapons."2 That would create the exact opposite of the professed objective of global missile defense: security for all who want it.

Nicole C. Evans, a lecturer at Wadham College, Oxford, is completing her doctorate in international relations at St. Antony's College, Oxford.

1. Vladimir Isachenkov, "U.S. Nuke Development Concerns Russia," Associated Press, November 26, 2003.
2. Vladimir Simonov, "Commentary: The USA Should Not Be a Nuclear Club of One," RIA Novosti, September 1, 2003.

http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2004/so04/so04evans.html

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New York Times

South Korea Admits Enriching Uranium to Near Bomb Grade

By REUTERS

Published: September 2, 2004

Filed at 11:33 a.m. ET

SEOUL/VIENNA (Reuters) - South Korea has admitted that government scientists enriched uranium four years ago to a level that several Vienna diplomats said was almost pure enough for an atomic bomb, the U.N. nuclear watchdog said on Thursday.

Although only a minute quantity of uranium was involved, two Western diplomats close to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said the enrichment was below but ``very close'' to the threshold for bomb-grade uranium.

``It was well beyond the level that would be needed for a civilian program,'' one of the diplomats told Reuters. ``The government says that its program is peaceful and the IAEA is not making any judgments on that issue.''

South Korea said in a statement the U.N. nuclear watchdog was investigating the disclosure. It said the experiments, which involved enriching uranium with lasers, were carried out by a group of scientists without government knowledge and soon ended.

``This is enrichment of uranium,'' a government official told Reuters by telephone. Other government officials had earlier said the experiments did not go as far as enriching uranium.

The IAEA said in a statement that Seoul had told the agency that ``these activities were carried out without the government's knowledge at a nuclear site in Korea in 2000.''

At the same time, a Vienna diplomat said the scientists were government employees working at a government-run facility.

South Korea has signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors the right to conduct more intrusive, short-notice visits to nuclear sites than normal NPT safeguards permit.

``With the Additional Protocol in force, it would have been difficult for Korea to keep this a secret,'' the diplomat said.

The IAEA said a team of inspectors was now in South Korea and would be returning to Vienna early next week. The agency's chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, would present the inspectors' findings to the IAEA Board of Governors when it meets on Sept. 13.

CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE NPT, DIPLOMATS

The experiments clearly did not constitute a violation of the NPT because they were not an attempt to build nuclear weapons, the South Korean official said.

However, several diplomats on the IAEA's 35-member Board of Governors said that South Korea had clearly violated its obligations under the NPT, which requires that such activities be reported to the IAEA. They said the board had no choice but to report such violations to the U.N. Security Council.

``This will have to be reported to the Security Council, but the board would want that to be with the consent of the South Korean government, similar to what we did with Libya,'' one Western diplomat said on condition of anonymity.

Earlier this year the IAEA board reported Libya to the Security Council, which has the power to impose sanctions, though the report was purely informative and praised Tripoli for coming clean about its past secret atomic weapons program.

Another Western diplomat close to the IAEA said that the agency would naturally want to fulfill its duty as the watchdog of the NPT by conducting a thorough investigation to rule out the possibility that South Korea has a secret weapons program.

The revelation could prove embarrassing to Seoul, which is a key member of six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

U.S. officials said in October 2002 that the North had admitted to running a secret nuclear program based on uranium enrichment technology.

Pyongyang has since denied the claim. It has yet to comment on the latest South Korean disclosure.

South Korea began a secret atomic weapons program in the 1970s under Park Chung-hee, a military dictator who was assassinated in 1979. Park's program is widely believed to have only ended with his death.

The IAEA has made similar discoveries of minute amounts of enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium in Iran, which Washington considers as evidence that Tehran is using its civilian nuclear energy program as a front for developing atomic weapons.

Iran says the United States is wrong and insists its nuclear ambitions are limited to the peaceful generation of electricity.

The South Korean government learned of the enrichment experiments while drawing up its first report to the IAEA, submitted this month, the Seoul statement said.

The experiments were conducted in January and February 2000 as part of research in producing nuclear fuel in the country, it said. A minute quantity, 0.2 gram, of uranium was successfully enriched. All facilities and the uranium were destroyed immediately after the experiments, the statement added.

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-nuclear-korea-iaea.html

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Philadelphia Inquirer
September 3, 2004

Iran's Uranium Plans Not Secret, Tehran Says

By Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press

TEHRAN, Iran - Iran acknowledged yesterday that it planned to process tons of raw uranium but said the International Atomic Energy Agency was informed long ago.

The IAEA said in a report circulated to diplomats earlier this week that Iran planned to process more than 40 tons of uranium into uranium hexafluoride gas. Experts said the amount was enough for four or five nuclear warheads.

The IAEA report did not specify what plans Iran had for the material, which is spun in centrifuges to produce enriched uranium. This can then be used to generate electricity or make nuclear warheads, depending on the degree of enrichment.

Ali Akbar Salehi, a senior adviser to Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, said yesterday that Iran's plans were not a secret. "This is the information Iran provided to the IAEA a long time ago," he said.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said Wednesday that the United States would urge the IAEA board at its meeting later this month to refer the Iranian case to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.

Iran denies the allegation and insists its nuclear program is geared only toward producing electricity, not a nuclear bomb.

Salehi, Iran's former envoy to the Vienna, Austria-based IAEA, said Iran's uranium-conversion facility in the central city of Isfahan had a capacity of converting 30 tons of uranium ore into hexafluoride gas annually.

"The agency knew the capacity of the facility before it was built," he said. "The facility is under IAEA safeguards."

He said the capacity of Iran's uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz was also 30 tons per year. The facility uses centrifuges to enrich uranium hexafluoride gas and turn it into pellets then used as fuel in nuclear reactors.

The Isfahan facility was inaugurated in March, but last year, Iran suspended uranium enrichment in Natanz as a confidence-building gesture toward the international community.

http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/9568112.htm

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Washington Times
September 3, 2004
Pg. 5

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

Korean missile threat

Asian military affairs specialist Richard D. Fisher says North Korea's new long-range missile "poses a significantly increased threat to the United States and Japan."

The missile is described by Mr. Fisher as derived from the Soviet-era SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile. It was Moscow's first sub-launched missile.

The CIA expected the North Koreans to display the new missile during a September 2003 parade, but it never appeared.

The North Koreans are thought to have 10 missiles and five transporter-erector-launchers at the Mirim air base near Pyongyang.

"At longer range this missile, fired from North Korean territory, could reach Okinawa and Guam," Mr. Fisher says. "... With a circular error probability of about one mile, it is accurate enough for North Korea, which needs only to threaten a large American military base or city, like Honolulu or Los Angeles."

Mr. Fisher warns that the "simplest option" for the North Koreans would be to use the missile hidden in a shipping container on one of North Korea's merchant ships.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, as we noted in this space last week, warned about the danger of ship-launched, short-range missiles in a recent speech. He said a Middle East nation tested a missile from a merchant ship in the late 1990s. The nation was Iran, which has close ties to North Korea in the area of missiles.

Air Force Gen. Ralph Eberhart, commander of the U.S. Northern Command, also said recently that the danger of ship-based missiles is growing.

"I believe it's just a matter of time until the terrorists try to use a ... maritime attack against us," he said. "I believe that attack could come in terms of bringing a ship into port, whether it's [carrying] high explosives or whether it's weapons of mass destruction."
Notes Mr. Fisher: "Should North Korea adopt this strategy, it would have the option of trying to infiltrate and pre-position its missiles in Canada, Central America or even the continental United States. U.S. missile defenses do not currently defend against either launches from the south of or within the contiguous 50 states."
http://www.washtimes.com/national/inring.htm

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Washington Post

S. Korea Acknowledges Secret Nuclear Experiments

IAEA Announces Probe of Activities
By Dafna Linzer and Joohee Cho
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, September 3, 2004; Page A02

South Korean government scientists secretly enriched uranium to nearly bomb-grade levels in experiments conducted four years ago, officials in Seoul and Vienna acknowledged yesterday, as the International Atomic Energy Agency announced it had launched a major investigation of the country's programs and nuclear technologies. U.S. officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the United States had begun a separate inquiry into whether the scientists involved had trained at U.S. nuclear facilities as part of friendly exchange programs and whether the technology may have come from the United States years ago.

Experts and diplomats said revelations that a U.S. ally conducted secret nuclear work, in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, could complicate efforts by the Bush administration to increase international pressure on Iran and North Korea, which are also accused of conducting clandestine programs.

The administration wants Iran referred to the U.N. Security Council for violating its commitments to the treaty. But South Korea, also a signatory to the treaty, could face the Security Council first, some diplomats said on the condition of anonymity.

State Department spokesman Richard A. Boucher said during a briefing Wednesday that the South Koreans should not have been doing such work, but he applauded their disclosures and cooperation with the IAEA.

The agency dispatched a team to South Korea over the weekend. The inspectors will report back to IAEA headquarters in Vienna early next week, agency spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said in a statement. The findings will be presented to the IAEA board when it meets on Sept. 13.

The treaty requires all members to report any uranium-enrichment activities to the IAEA. Not doing so is considered a serious violation.

Confronted by mounting suspicions within the IAEA, the South Koreans admitted to the activity on Aug. 23 in a written declaration to the agency. But in statements Wednesday, Seoul said that it was a one-time experiment conducted without government authorization and that it was geared toward the country's nuclear energy program. South Korean officials emphasized that only a tiny amount of uranium was enriched. But diplomats in Vienna said the amount was enriched to nearly bomb-grade level -- a technological feat few countries have achieved.

The officials also said the facility was dismantled after the experiment. Inspectors are trying to determine how long it took the South Koreans to complete the experiment, where they got the uranium and when they discontinued the research.

"Not only did they have an undeclared uranium-enrichment program, but they were actually making something close to bomb-grade, so you have to conclude someone wanted to develop a capability to make nuclear weapons," said David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and head of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security.

The South Korean scientists, working at a government laboratory, used laser isotope separation to enrich the uranium. Experts said the laser process, which identifies and then extracts uranium isotopes for enrichment, has no practical civilian applications and is not used in any nuclear energy program.

Countries such as the United States long ago gave up on the possibility of using the process commercially because it was too difficult and expensive.

The announcement came as the Bush administration launched new diplomatic efforts aimed at increasing pressure on Iran for hiding nuclear programs that it also maintains are peaceful.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said Wednesday that he will begin calling his counterparts in France, Britain and Germany to strategize on Iran ahead of the IAEA meeting.

"This could not have come at a worse time for the Bush administration's efforts on both Iran and North Korea," said Jon Wolfsthal, a nonproliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Iran is going to say the U.S. is giving an ally a free pass, while the North Koreans are going to accuse the U.S. and the South of hypocrisy and warmongering."

A U.S. official involved in setting North Korea policy expressed concern that North Korea would use the revelations to its advantage and negatively affect six-party talks among the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea aimed at defusing a crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear program.

After months of tensions between the United States and North Korea, Pyongyang threw out IAEA inspectors in December 2002 and walked away from the treaty shortly afterward, a move that heightened suspicions the country was continuing to develop nuclear capability.

The United States helped persuade South Korea to give up a secret weapons program in the 1970s, and over the years has discouraged it from buying materials that could have nuclear weapons applications.

Seoul's disclosure was made in a written declaration detailing its compliance with the nonproliferation treaty.

Daryl G. Kimball, head of the Arms Control Association, said the South Korean experiment "underscores the value and need for better international verification. This needs to be the universal standard that all states have to live by," he said.

Special correspondent Cho reported from Seoul.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56258-2004Sep2.html

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